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Article
Evaluation of Large-Scale
Public-Sector Reforms:
A Comparative Analysis
Karen N. Breidahl1, Gunnar Gjelstrup2,
Hanne Foss Hansen2, and Morten Balle Hansen1
Abstract
Research on the evaluation of large-scale public-sector reforms is rare. This article sets out to fill
that gap in the evaluation literature and argues that it is of vital importance since the impact of such
reforms is considerable and they change the context in which evaluations of other and more
delimited policy areas take place. In our analysis, we apply four governance perspectives (rational-
instrumental perspective, rational interest–based perspective, institutional-cultural perspective, and
chaos perspective) in a comparative analysis of the evaluations of two large-scale public-sector
reforms in Denmark and Norway. We compare the evaluation process (focus and purpose), the
evaluators, and the organization of the evaluation, as well as the utilization of the evaluation results.
The analysis uncovers several significant findings including how the initial organization of the eva-
luation shows strong impact on the utilization of the evaluation and how evaluators can approach the
challenges of evaluating large-scale reforms.
Keywords
evaluation use, meta-evaluation, multilevel evaluation, governance, reform
The number of large-scale public-sector reforms aimed at changing political and administrative
structures and processes have increased in many European and Anglosphere countries since the
1980s (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011a). However, in spite of the significance and impacts of these
reforms, a country comparison in 2003 showed that evaluation researchers had underexplored
these reforms:
Public-sector reform and evaluation have been closely interlinked almost like Siamese twins throughout
the past 30 years or so. Yet an inspection of the available literature on public-sector reforms and
evaluation reveals a glaring discrepancy: while the fields of public-sector reform and of evaluation have
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each brought forth a huge body of literature and research, these two realms have been largely treated as
separate entities. (Wollmann, 2003b, p. 1)
The interlinkage between public-sector reform and evaluation can be analyzed from two per-
spectives. One perspective asks to what degree the diffusion of evaluation has been part of and
contributed to the diffusion of ideas about public administration, and another perspective asks to
what degree, why, and how the evaluations of public-sector reforms have been conducted. This
article is concerned with the second perspective. Focus is on large-scale public-sector reform which
is defined as reforms cutting across governmental levels and policy fields. Scholars within the field
of comparative public administration have also in recent years concluded that the evaluation of
public-sector reforms has largely been absent (Kuhlmann & Wollmann, 2011) and remains a rarity
(Kuhlmann & Wollmann, 2014) especially in relation to reforms aimed at changing subnational
(regional and local) levels. As we will account for thoroughly in the next section, our own updated
review of international literature on research on the evaluation of public-sector reforms in the period
1995–2015 does not challenge this conclusion: Research on the evaluation of large-scale public-
sector reforms is for sure an exception and compared to the countless substantive sector reforms in
for instance the health-care sector and the education system large-scale public-sector reforms are a
rare evaluand (Pollitt, 1995, p. 135; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011b; Wollmann, 2003b).1
This reflects how most evaluation literature (including the North American) for several years
mainly have been concerned with specific program and intervention evaluations rather than research
on to what degree, why, and how the evaluations of public-sector reforms have been conducted.
In this article, we argue that not only is knowing how to evaluate large-scale public-sector
reforms of critical importance; so too is knowing how to conduct research on and evaluate the
nature of these evaluations, their utilization, and the broader role they play in public-sector reforms.
This is a challenging endeavor: Evaluations of large-scale public-sector reforms involve a very high
degree of complexity, as this type of reform cuts across governmental levels and policy sectors.
Large-scale public-sector reforms are further as also many sectorial reforms surrounded by much
political interest and their (often) ambiguous aims are based on political compromises and involve a
heterogeneous group of actors. Furthermore, their target groups are complex and they imply com-
plex issues that are implemented over a long time period, whereby the contexts of evaluations are
always in flux. Together, these characteristics make it difficult both to evaluate these reforms and to
evaluate the evaluations of these reforms (Andreassen & Aars, 2015; M. B. Hansen, Breidahl,
Furubo, & Halvorsen, in press; M. B. Hansen, Breidahl, Halvorsen, & Furubo, 2015; Pollitt, 1995).
Nevertheless, it is vital to better understand the dynamic and complex nature of large-scale
public-sector reforms and evaluations of them. Due to their large-scale nature, the impact of these
reforms is considerable and they also change the structural boundaries and context in which the
evaluations of other and more defined policy areas within the public sector take place (Pollitt, 1995).
It is therefore important to better grasp the complexity of these evaluations and their consequences.
Furthermore, from a more instrumental point of view, a better understanding of these evaluations is
important for successful implementation and for the sustainability of existing reforms.
This article intends to fill this research gap. In order to do so, it systematically compares and
examines recent evaluations of two large-scale public-sector reforms in two Nordic countries: the
reform of the labor and welfare administration in Norway (NAV reform) and the local government
reform in Denmark (LGR reform). The reforms, which were carried out in the 2000s, represent the
most important public-sector reforms in the two countries in recent decades and have a number of
characteristics in common: They were adopted centrally by Parliament (Storting/Folketing), they
affected large parts of the public sector and the population, they had several and partly incompatible
objectives, and they developed and changed over time. Furthermore, the two reforms were char-
acterized by a focus on formal structural change, as the main policy instrument and included the
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state, regional, and local levels of public administration. Finally, and crucial in this context, both
reforms have been evaluated. Systematically comparing and examining these two cases allows us to
contribute to a neglected research field and shed light on the complexity of the evaluation of large-
scale public-sector reforms and hopefully on how evaluators can approach the substantial challenges
of evaluating this type of reform.
Despite the similarities of the reforms, the evaluations were organized, implemented, and utilized
in very different ways and with very different impacts. While the evaluation of the NAV reform in
Norway was organized as a research-based external evaluation, the evaluation of the Danish munic-
ipal reform was organized as an internal evaluation, with evaluation responsibilities resting with key
stakeholders. Our analysis shows that the way these evaluations were organized had significant
impact on the output as well as the outcomes of the evaluations, including how they were utilized.
Hence, while the evaluation of the NAV reform was used mainly for knowledge creation and
building a democratic debate, the evaluation of the local government reform was used instrumentally
to adjust the division of labor between levels of government in selected areas of activity.
These notable differences between the two evaluations raise three research questions, which we
will explore in the empirical analysis: (1) How were the two evaluations initiated and carried out? (2)
How were they utilized? and (3) How can we theoretically interpret the main differences and simila-
rities between the two evaluations? While the first two questions are answered through a comparative
analysis of the core elements of the reforms and the process, organization, and utilization of the two
evaluations, the third question is answered through a theoretically informed analysis based on four
governance theory positions: a rational-instrumental perspective, a political interest–based perspec-
tive, an institutional-cultural perspective, and a chaos perspective. Applying these different theore-
tical perspectives allows us to better grasp the complexity of the two evaluations and thereby
contribute to the existing evaluation literature, where these insights are more or less absent. Each
of the perspectives also raises several questions that we will deal with in the final section of the article.
The article unfolds as follows: We start by clarifying the concept of large-scale public-sector
reforms and present and discuss the findings of the international literature review. Moreover, we
outline the research design and methodology and the theoretical framework. Two analytical sections
follow: The first compares the two evaluations in terms of the (1) focus of the evaluation (the
evaluand) and the purpose of the evaluation, (2) organization of the evaluation, and (3) results and
utilization of the evaluations. The second examines and discusses how the nature of the two evalua-
tions and the differences between them can be interpreted according to the four governance theory
perspectives. The last section presents the conclusions and reflects on the implications of these for
handling the challenges of evaluating large-scale public-sector reforms.
Evaluating Large-Scale Public-Sector Reforms: Conceptualizations and
Existing Knowledge
As outlined in the Introduction section, a systematic international literature review in the period
1995–2015 has been conducted in order to outline existing knowledge on research on the evaluation
of large-scale public-sector reforms. However, before presenting the findings of the review, the
concept of large-scale public-sector reforms needs to be clarified.
The literature on public-sector reforms is characterized by conceptual ambiguity. Many concepts
are used, such as administrative reforms, public management reforms (new as well as post-new), and
(new) public governance reforms. We use the concept of public-sector reforms as a generic term
covering several types of reforms, all of which refer to formal changes in political and administra-
tive processes and structures in institutions of governance. Thus while such reforms may also
include ‘‘substantive policies’’ targeted at a concrete policy goal or policy output (crime prevention,
reduction of unemployment, etc.), their prime focus is on the processes and the structures of the
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public sector. Public-sector reforms are complex and follow several steps. The aim is to change the
political and administrative institutions, but these institutional changes are also intended to bring
further results ‘‘ . . . whether it be that the operational process (‘performance’) of public adminis-
tration or that the (final) ‘output’ and ‘product’ of the administrative operation is improved’’’
(Wollmann, 2003b, p. 5). Or as Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011a, p. 2) frame it to change ‘‘ . . . the
structures and processes of public sector organizations with the objective of getting them (in some
sense) to run better.’’ Public-sector reforms are therefore not defined by an exclusion of substantive
policies, but the primary focus is on change in governance institutions.
We are concerned not with all types of public-sector reforms but more precisely with large-scale
public-sector reforms. Large-scale reforms are reforms of considerable size. In line with H. F.
Hansen (2005b), size here refers to reforms cutting across governmental levels and policy fields.
Large-scale public-sector reforms are thus defined as multilevel, multisite, and cross-sectional
reforms aiming at changing political and administrative institutions.
As mentioned in the Introduction section, only one country comparative study on the evaluation
of large-scale public-sector reforms (mainly New Public Management reforms) has been carried out.
One of the conclusions drawn is that these reforms are most often organized as internal evaluations
rather than external evaluations conducted ‘‘ . . . by an agency or actor outside of and different from
the operating unit,’’ which is a rarity in all countries (Wollmann, 2003b, pp. 6, 250). Similarly, an
article comparing evaluations in and of large-scale public-sector reforms in Denmark from 1982 to
2005 to the Scandinavian countries finds that ‘‘Evaluations of reform activities have been partial,
seldom overall and mostly internal’’ (H. F. Hansen, 2005, p. 344).
In order to update and substantiate these findings, a systematic literature review on research on
the evaluation of large-scale public-sector reforms has been conducted of nine central international
journals on evaluation, public administration, and public policy: (1) American Journal of Evalua-
tion, (2) Canadian Journal of Program Evaluation, (3) Evaluation, (4) Evaluation Review, (5)
Evaluation and Program Planning, (6) Public Administration, (7) Public Administration Review,
(8) Journal of European Public Policy, and (9) Journal of Public Policy in the period from 1995 to
2015. The review has not included articles on specific evaluation of large-scale public-sector
reforms but has been focusing on research on the evaluation of large-scale public-sector reforms
and questions like, for example, to what degree, why, and how the evaluations of public-sector
reforms have been conducted. All possible knowledge of this subject has not been exhausted, but the
selected evaluation and public policy journals represent the vast majority of contributions within the
area of evaluations of public-sector reforms.
Due to the definitional challenges of defining the concept of ‘‘large-scale public-sector reforms’’
and conceptual ambiguity, it was necessary to apply a rather broad search strategy. Hence, all
articles combining the two terms ‘‘reform’’ and ‘‘evaluation’’ were included in order to make sure
that relevant articles were not excluded from the search results. Consequently, all articles combining
evaluation and a broad group of reforms (‘‘administrative,’’ ‘‘management,’’ ‘‘governance,’’ ‘‘large-
scale,’’ ‘‘welfare state,’’ ‘‘multilevel,’’ etc.) was included in the first round of search results for each
journal. This included up to 800 articles in some of the journals. Afterward, in the second search
round, all the articles were sorted by the authors based on a qualitative assessment of whether or not
they focused on the evaluations of large-scale public-sector reforms (based on our definition com-
pared above) and whether they focused on research on this type of evaluations or specific evalua-
tions. After this sorting process, the number of relevant articles was dramatically reduced to a select
few. Hence, most of the articles from the first selection of articles were concerned with the
evaluations of substantial policy sector areas such as educational reforms, welfare to work pro-
grams, and so on. The final selected group of articles included only few articles focusing on the
evaluations of large-scale public-sector reforms (Van Eyk, Baum, & Blandford, 2001) and a few
articles reporting on specific evaluations that have been conducted of public-sector reforms
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(Kuhlmann, Bogumil, & Grohs, 2008; Pedersen & Rieper, 2008). Another article was concerned
with problems related to not evaluating new public-sector reforms and why there is resistance to
doing so (Broadbent & Laughlin, 1997). Finally, one article discussed whether inputs from
evaluations are used in reforms of administrative and public-sector management (Thoenig, 2000).
A clear conclusion from the literature review is that existing research on evaluations of large-
scale public-sector reforms (to what degree, why, and how the evaluations of public-sector reforms
have been conducted) is scarce. Thus, the present analysis fills an important gap in the literature.
Research Design, Empirical Material, and Methodology
The research design is based on a comparison of two cases that are in some ways similar, but in other
ways different, especially in terms of the organization and utilization of the evaluations. Thus, we
consider the comparison of the two as a critical case for the study of evaluations of large-scale public-
sector reforms. A deep understanding of differences and similarities can form a starting point for
considerations of how to handle dilemmas in the evaluation of such reforms. This is also the reasoning
behind making the comparison quite detailed. The comparative analysis of the two evaluations (the
NAV evaluation and the LGR evaluation) is based on a broad range of documents (including minutes
from meetings, policy documents, reports, different bills, and evaluation proposals) as well as a
systematic review of all material published as part of the evaluations—about 87 reports and articles
in Norway and 13 reports in Denmark. Furthermore, semistructured interviews have been conducted
among a number of key figures and stakeholders in both countries. Thirteen interviews were con-
ducted in the spring of 2014 in Norway among civil servants representing the public evaluation
sponsors; evaluators (researchers) responsible for the design, execution, and findings of the evalua-
tion; representatives from the Norwegian Research Council; members of the steering committee
appointed by the research council; the national agency managers from the Norwegian Labor and
Welfare Service; and a representative from the Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Author-
ities. As there is a large and transparent body of documentary material of the Danish evaluation, there
was no need for a large number of interviews in relation to this case. Therefore, four interviews were
conducted in the spring of 2013 with key participants in the evaluation process. Of these, three were
members of the committee responsible for conducting the evaluation, and one was a member of one of
the four subgroups responsible for the interim reports, which formed part of the input that led to the
overall report. The interview guides consisted of a range of themes, including process, organization,
results, outcomes, utilization, and administrative follow-up (Breidahl, Furubo, Halvorsen, & Hansen,
2014; Gjelstrup & Hansen, 2014). The interviews have been transcribed. An analysis of the data has
been published previously in Danish and Norwegian (Breidahl et al., 2014; Breidahl, Gjelstrup,
Hansen, & Hansen, 2015; Gjelstrup & Hansen, 2014; M. B. Hansen, Breidahl, Halvorsen, et al., 2015).
Theoretical Framework
Theoretically, the analysis draws on four governance perspectives, including two rational perspec-
tives (one instrumental and one interest based), one institutional-cultural perspective, and a per-
spective that is the outright antithesis of the rational: the chaos perspective. This analytical strategy
positions the analysis in line with Graham T. Allison’s classic argument, better enabling us to grasp
the complexity of the two evaluation processes (Allison, 1971). The analytical strategy followed is a
‘‘filling strategy’’ (Grøn, Hansen, & Kristiansen, 2014; Roness, 1997), sometimes also referred to as
a complementary strategy. This means that the four perspectives in the framework supplement each
other, as they contribute to the interpretation of the two evaluations as well as of the different phases
in the two evaluation processes. Table 1 gives an overview of how organizational activities, actors,
and reform implementation processes are understood in the four different perspectives.
Breidahl et al. 5
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The rational-instrumental perspective is rational in a collective and system-based sense (Scott &
Davis, 2007, chap. 2). It is based on the idea that means are selected that will match and promote
system and organizational objectives. Actors are compliant and reforms are implemented in planned
and linear processes.
The concept of rationality underlining the interest-based perspective is narrower. The interest-
based perspective sees the world as consisting of groups, organizations, and fields of organization
that, through negotiations and bargaining, seek to promote their own interests as far as possible
(Scott & Davis, 2007). In this perspective, a reform process is considered an arena for debate and
political bargaining. The negotiations may concern the content of the reform as well as its
implementation.
According to the institutional-cultural perspective, attitudes, norms, values, and traditions govern
the behavior of individuals, organizations, and fields of organization. The stakeholders are expected
to follow the informal rules of the game, which evolve over time in a collective learning process
related to how challenges are addressed (March & Olsen, 1989; Schein, 1985). According to this
perspective, reforms are implemented through translation processes adapting the reform content to
the cultural context.
Finally, the chaos perspective emphasizes the importance of ambiguity, complexity, and
changeability for the way in which organizations and fields of organization develop. Organi-
zations and fields of organization are understood as emergent, that is they do not change
because of linear processes that can be explained by the existing organization, but instead
in ways that can be explained based on their loosely connected ecological nature (March,
1999; Stacey, 2011; Weick, 2001). The chaos perspective, therefore, does not consider pro-
cesses of organizational change to be irrational or, generally speaking, incremental. Rather,
random factors caused by time-specific connections between the stakeholders’ attention and
resources, as well as their connections to solution and problem streams, influence reform
processes (March & Olsen, 1986).
Table 1. Four Conceptual Models for Analyzing the Evaluation of Public-Sector Reforms.
Dimensions
Rational-
Instrumental
Perspective
Rational Interest–
Based Perspective
Institutional-
Cultural
Perspective Chaos Perspective
Activities are Collective,
system-based
and anchored
in goal-means
rationality
Developed as results
of negotiations
Based on norms,
values and
standard
operating
procedures
(SOPs)
Emergent, since they take
place in contexts of
ambiguity, complexity,
and changeability
Actors are Compliant and
loyal
Promoting narrow
self-interest
Adapting to what is
seen as
appropriate
Characterized by shifting
attention to problems
and solutions, implying
that connections
between these become
random
Reforms are
implemented
Top down in
planned and
linear
processes
Through ongoing
negotiation
processes, implying
frequent
adjustments and
changes
Through translation
processes,
adapting the
content to the
cultural context
In emergent and
unpredictable processes
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The theoretical framework with the four perspectives can be applied to important dimensions put
forward in the evaluation literature to analyze and characterize specific evaluations. Table 2 pro-
vides an overview of how the evaluation processes, the role of evaluators, and the ways in which
evaluations are utilized are understood in the different perspectives, thereby contributing to the
development of evaluation theory and practice.
Applied to our focus on evaluation, the rational-instrumental perspective emphasizes that the
purpose of the evaluation determines its design. According to this perspective, we would expect the
democratically elected political leadership to agree on an evaluation goal and further, that this goal
would determine the organization and design of the evaluation, which constitute the framework of
the analyses, assessments, and conclusions. In this perspective, evaluators are expected to play the
role of neutral experts, carrying out the evaluation and reporting the results to the decision makers
and the actors responsible for the implementation of reforms.
Applied to our focus on evaluation, the rational interest–based perspective emphasizes that
evaluation processes are considered arenas for debate. The negotiations may concern the
timing, purpose, focus, and organization of the evaluation, as well as the conclusions drawn
and solutions proposed during the follow-up. Evaluators act either in the roles of facilitators of
negotiation or as promoters of self-interest. Both evaluation processes and results are used in
tactical ways.
Applied to our focus on evaluation, the institutional-cultural perspective emphasizes that general
public-sector values, as well as more specific evaluation values, would influence the design and
organization of concrete evaluations. Evaluation processes are used by evaluators for the creation of
meaning and evaluation results, for legitimizing.
Finally, applied to our focus on evaluation, the chaos perspective emphasizes the emergent nature
of the evaluation processes. Evaluation processes are assumed to be complex and dynamic processes
evolving in unpredictable ways. Evaluators may actively create platforms to further development
processes. Utilization is unpredictable as both processes and results may be coupled in garbage can–
like processes to agendas outside the reform and evaluation focus.
The four perspectives will be used in both the analysis and the discussion of the way the two
evaluations were organized and designed, and in the broader analysis of the reform processes and the
follow-up to them.
Table 2. Four Perspectives on Essential Dimensions of Evaluation.
Dimensions
Rational-Instrumental
Perspective
Rational Interest–Based
Perspective
Institutional-Cultural
Perspective Chaos Perspective
Evaluation
processes
are
Organized according to
agreements on
evaluation goals
Arenas for negotiations Culturally
determined
Emergent and
unpredictable
Evaluators
play the
roles of
Experts Facilitators of
negotiations between
stakeholders and/or
promoters of self-
interest
Creators of meaning Creators of
platforms for
further
development
processes
Utilization Evaluation results are
used in instrumental
ways for controlling
the results of
reforms and deciding
on adjustments
Evaluation processes as
well as results are
used in tactical ways as
stepping-stones for
stakeholders’
promotion of self-
interest
Evaluation processes
are used to create
meaning and
results are used to
legitimize the
reforms
Both evaluation
processes and
results are used
in unpredictable
garbage can–like
ways
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Two Large-Scale Public-Sector Reforms and Two Evaluations:
A Comparative Analysis
In this section, the results of the comparative analysis are presented. First, the two reforms are briefly
introduced and their core elements are compared. Then, the evaluations of the two reforms are
compared on the dimensions discussed above in the theoretical framework (the evaluation process,
the evaluators, and the utilization of evaluation results). However, before turning to the analysis the
context will be presented.
Context
Norway and Denmark share many features. Both countries are decentralized unitary states (H. F.
Hansen, 2011; M. B. Hansen, Lægreid, Pierre, & Salminen, 2012). Both are well organized and have
long traditions for involving stakeholders in policy development and implementation. Both are also
renowned for providing relatively high social protection and generous benefits, for their universal,
predominantly tax-financed welfare state arrangements, and for their high degree of government
intervention and welfare state services, which are mainly provided by public-sector institutions
(Brochmann & Hagelund, 2012).
In both countries, evaluation practice was for many years embedded in separate disciplinary
scientific fields (Hansson, 1998; Haug, 1998), influenced more by continental philosophy than by
logical empiricism (Schwandt, 1998). But in the last 15 years, evaluation in both countries has
developed into a field in its own right with a broad group of actors taking many approaches and
engaging in discussions in associations and at conferences. Partly as a result of this, the evaluation
cultures in both countries are characterized as mature (Jacob, Speer, & Furubo, 2015). In this
context, it could be expected that evaluating large-scale public-sector reforms like the ones in focus
here would be taken for granted in both countries.
Analytical Comparison of the Two Public Management Reforms
The core dimensions of the two large-scale public-sector reforms are summarized in Table 3.
The labor and welfare reform in Norway came into force on January 1, 2006 (Andreassen & Aars,
2015; Fimreite & Laegreid, 2009). The reform was comprehensive and entailed the amalgamation of
three services (the employment service, the national insurance administration, and the social ser-
vices). Moreover, the reform implied partnerships between the new labor and welfare administration
on the one hand and local governments on the other. The overall goal was to reduce the share of
persons in the workforce receiving social benefits, and the three objectives were integration of
services, user orientation, and efficiency improvement (Arbeids-og Socialdepartementet [ASD],
2004–2005). The first initiative to reform the welfare administration was taken in 2001 by the
Norwegian parliament (Storting) and a final decision was made in 2005, when the reform was
adopted by a broad majority of the Storting. At the same time, it was decided to evaluate the reform.
The implementation of the reform was initiated in 2006 and lasted until 2010. The reform underwent
changes during this time, with two major reorganizations taking place; in 2008, for example, the so-
called administrative units were rolled out. The time span of the evaluation was from 2007 to 2014.
The local government reform in Denmark came into force on January 1, 2007. It comprised an
amalgamation reform, a task reform, and a financial reform (Indenrigsministeriet, 2005). A total of
271 municipalities were amalgamated into 98, and 14 counties were amalgamated into five regions.
The task reform changed the division of labor between state, regions, and municipalities, and the
financial reform changed the financing of the tasks. The objectives of the reforms were, as in the
Norwegian case, multiple and somewhat ambiguous: to create sustainable local governments, to
solve tasks close to citizens, and to secure synergy gains. Major parts of the reform were adopted by
8 American Journal of Evaluation
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a small majority of the Danish Parliament (Folketinget). The implementation of the reform was
initiated in 2005 and spanned over several years. Parts of the reform were changed as it was
implemented. For instance, the labor market services were transferred to the municipalities in
2009. An evaluation of the reform was not decided until 2011 after a period with political disagree-
ment on the question and after a new government had come into office.
As stated earlier, the two reforms have on the one hand several significant similarities. They are
both large-scale public-sector reforms involving a changed distribution of tasks between the state
and local governments. On the other hand, there was a significant difference in the approach to the
question of whether or not the reform should be evaluated. Thus, in Norway, the evaluation was
embedded in the decision about making the reform, whereas in Denmark the evaluation issue created
political disagreement. This difference between the two evaluations will be analyzed further below,
with particular focus on whether there are also differences in the three dimensions previously stated
in the theoretical framework: (1) the evaluation process (focus and purpose), (2) the evaluators and
the organization of the evaluations, and (3) the utilization of the results of the evaluations. The major
findings regarding the differences between the two evaluations are summarized in Table 4.
The Evaluation Process: Focus and Purpose
In the evaluation literature, the object of an evaluation can be specified on the basis of whether it
focuses on the whole or on individual parts, whether it has a policy or organizational focus, a focus
on systems or individual organizations/case studies, or a focus on outcomes or processes. Similarly,
the literature introduces a whole range of possible purposes for a given evaluation—for example,
checking whether the intentions were realized; documenting effects; identifying implementation
problems encountered in order to make adjustments; or enlightening, in terms of broad policy
learning (H. F. Hansen, 2005a; Rossi, Freeman, & Lipsey, 2004; Vedung, 1997).
The focus of the NAV evaluation was all parts of the comprehensive reform. Thus, the focus was
broad and comprised both the whole and the individual parts, and the policy and organization.
Similarly, the purpose of the NAV evaluation was to assess the degree of goal fulfillment (Are
more people employed? Has there been an increase in user orientation and efficiency?), to assess the
implementation process, to suggest adjustments, and to enlighten through long-term knowledge
building. The broad focus and the multiple purposes were determined at an early stage in a ‘‘Goal
and framework document’’ (ASD, 2006). It was taken for granted that the reform should be
Table 3. Core Elements in the Two Large-Scale Public-Sector Reforms.
Dimensions Labor and Welfare Reform (Norway) Local Government Reform (Denmark)
Reform decision Decided by Parliament (Stortinget). Short
time from adoption to entry into force
(2005 to January 1, 2006)
Decided by Parliament (Folketinget). Short
time from adoption to entry into force
(2004/06 to January 1, 2007)
A large
administrative
reform?
Yes. Implies multiple actors, both structural
and other changes: merger of three
different units into one unit, partnership
organizations (state and municipalities)
Yes. Implies multiple actors, both structural
and other changes: amalgamations (from
271 municipalities to 98, from 14 counties
to 5 regions), task, and financial reform
Multipurpose? Yes and not very clear: integration of
services, user orientation, and efficiency
Yes and not very clear: sustainable local
government, solve tasks close to citizens,
and synergy gains
Evaluations of
the reform?
Yes. Decision embedded in reform decision
2005. Evaluation from 2007 to 2014
Yes, but not decided until 2011 by new
government after political disagreement
(2007–2011). Evaluation from 2011 to
2012
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evaluated, and both practitioners and researchers took part in the preparation of the document. The
Norwegian Research Council organized the evaluation and appointed a steering committee includ-
ing representatives of the most important players in the evaluation. In accordance with its different
purposes, the execution of the evaluation of the NAV reform was organized as seven different
subprojects coordinated by a project leader.
One of the important differences between the two evaluations concerns the evaluation process, its
focus, and its purpose. The focus and purpose of the LGR evaluation was not made clear from the
beginning, but it was developed over time in five phases.
Once the reform process began, the opposition suggested a broad evaluation, but they could not
obtain a majority in Parliament (Folketinget, 2009, 2010; Folketingets Lovsekretariat, 2011). In this
phase, attempts were made to clarify the object of an evaluation, but the purpose was not specified.
After an election, the opposition took over and an evaluation had become a political commitment:
‘‘The government will conduct an evaluation of the local government reform and the current division
of responsibilities between municipalities, regions and the state. This process will focus on health,
specialized social services, the environment and regional development’’ (Regeringen, 2011, p. 64).
The focus of the evaluation was more precise, but quite broad, focusing on both the whole and the parts
and on both policy and organization. The purpose of the evaluation had still not been clarified.
When the terms for the evaluation were published, they stated that the evaluation was to result in
an assessment of ‘‘ . . . the division of responsibilities between municipalities, regions and the state
at the moment, and to consider appropriate adjustments to the current situation’’ (Ministry for
Economic Affairs and the Interior [MEI], 2012). Thus, the focus of the evaluation had been signif-
icantly reduced. Only if the analysis revealed interface problems, would discussions need to be held
about solutions. The focus was no longer on the whole reform, but four policy areas, and it was not
on the content of the policy, but on organizational areas (interfaces between parts of the system). The
purpose had been narrowed down to a service check (potentially resulting in adjustments) rather than
a study of the extent to which the intentions behind the reform had been met or a study of its effects.
During the evaluation process the evaluation committee formulated multisectorial themes on
which they wanted to focus (including political governance and sustainability). The themes paved
Table 4. Comparison of Two Evaluations of Large-Scale Public Management Reforms.
Dimensions
Evaluation of Labor and Welfare
Reform (Norway)
Evaluation of Local Government
Reform (Denmark)
The evaluation
process (focus and
purpose)
Focus: Broad focus on central reform
elements established from the beginning
Purpose: Goal fulfillment, documentation
of implementation process, policy
learning
Focus: Initially broad focus, later narrow
focus on needs for adjustments in four
policy areas, gradual change toward
more focus on goal fulfillment
Purpose: Formally a ‘‘service check,’’
informally: to legitimize the reform
The evaluators and
the organization of
the evaluation
External: Two consortiums organized into
seven modules headed by university and
sector researchers
Internal: A committee with stakeholders
headed by a high-level civil servant
Utilization of
evaluation results
Broad knowledge building and democratic
debate. Little input to implementation
process and adjustment of reform
Results: Hardly any improvement in
employment or user orientation.
Several organizational challenges
87 publications
Recommendations to adjust the reform are
under implementation. Reestablished
political consensus on the utility of the
reform
Results: Interorganizational coordination
problems. Suggestions to adjust the
reform. Probably more sustainable local
governments. 13 publications
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the way to incorporate a broader focus on the reform. This also opened up for slippage in the purpose
in the direction of incorporating an assessment of the degree of goal fulfillment.
When the results of the evaluation were published, the main conclusion (see the Results section)
contained an assessment of the degree of goal fulfillment. Thus, the slippage identified above is
confirmed by the report.
Thus, the actual structure of the LGR evaluation ended up with having both four evaluations
focusing on different areas and an overall evaluation.
The Evaluators and the Organization of Two Evaluations
Evaluation literature distinguishes between internal and external evaluations mainly using organiza-
tional boundaries as dividing lines and focusing on whether the producer of the evaluation, the
evaluator, is chosen within or outside the organization (Mathison, 2005; Vedung, 1997). Applying
this distinction to large-scale public-sector reforms means that if actors responsible for reform
implementation are appointed as evaluators, the evaluation becomes internal, whereas if evaluators
are appointed from outside the organizational field in which the reform is implemented, the evalua-
tion becomes external. It is of course possible to combine the two types of evaluation.
The NAV evaluation was organized as a special kind of external evaluation. Thus, the Ministry of
Labor and Inclusion was responsible for the overall evaluation, while the Norwegian Research Council
was responsible for the organization, including the professional and administrative contact with the
evaluators in the research environment. The selection of evaluators took place in a process where the
research council appointed an expert group to assess applications and propose which to choose to a
steering committee consisting of three members appointed by the research council and stakeholders. The
appointed evaluators consisted of two consortiums, one of which was given the overall responsibility,
while a leader was assigned to each of the seven modules into which the evaluation was organized. The
overall budget framework for the period from 2007 to 2014 was approximately NOK 45 million.
The LGR evaluation was internal in the sense that responsibility for it lays with stakeholders also
responsible for implementing LGR. They were organized in a relatively restricted committee with
four subcommittees, one for each of the four areas. The committee was composed of representatives
from key ministries and local government associations. An experienced director general was
appointed chairperson. The subcommittees comprised representatives of the same stakeholders as
the committee, supplemented by representatives from the relevant sectorial ministry, and with a civil
servant from that ministry as chairperson. The relevant sectorial ministry, in collaboration with the
MEI and the Ministry of Finance, supported the secretariat function. Overall, the organization of the
evaluation reflects the fact that the local government associations were accorded a central position
and that the sectorial ministries had a clear platform from which to provide input. In practice, the
organizational construction worked by the subcommittees acting as forums for both technical
discussions and negotiation and bargaining. Moreover, the main committee held a series of con-
sultations, for instance, with politicians and civil servants from local government and with interest
groups. A conservative estimate of the overall cost of this evaluation is more than DKK 10 million,
based on the working hours spent by the involved civil servants in ministries, associations, local
governments, and interest groups.
Utilization of Evaluation Results in the Two Evaluations
Within the evaluation literature, much attention is devoted to the questions of how evaluations can
be used and which type of processes they may influence. Distinctions are made both between
different forms of utilization, for instance, an instrumental use, enlightening use, legitimizing use,
and tactical use (Fleischer & Christie, 2009; Shulha & Cousins, 1997; Vedung, 1997) and between
specific influence processes related to, for instance, cognitive, motivational, and behavioral
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processes (Mark & Henry, 2004). The use of the NAV evaluation has primarily been enlightening,
for long-term knowledge creation and democratic debate, and only to a limited degree instrumental,
to influence the implementation process. Cognitive influence processes seem to be important.
The results of the NAV evaluation were disseminated during the process, for instance,
when the evaluators participated in the public debate and in a series of meetings with the
stakeholders. The results were documented in roughly 87 publications, most of them with a
Norwegian research audience as the target group. Most of the studies focused on the imple-
mentation of the reform and only some on the degree of goal fulfillment. Overall, the evalua-
tion resulted in pinpointing a series of more general perspectives, for example, that it was too
comprehensive for several municipalities to integrate three services, that it was challenging to
establish partnerships between the state and local governments, that the employment of
specialists or generalists in the NAV offices was connected with dilemmas, and that the
reform (in the short run) hardly had improved job employment, user orientation, or efficiency.
The evaluation has only to a limited degree resulted in input to the implementation process
and proposals for adjustments. Instead, it contributed to long-term knowledge creation and
democratic debate due to the many publications and the dissemination of the results during
the process.
The results of the LGR evaluation were documented in 13 publications and a press release
from the minister published in March 2013. The main findings were as follows (MEI, 2013,
pp. 19–20): ‘‘Overall, the committee concludes that the local government reform has created a
framework for a more robust public sector that is better able to meet current and future
challenges. One of the main goals of the reform was to produce municipalities and regions
with greater professional and financial sustainability. Another expectation was that the local
government reform would be able to support cost-effective service provision with economies of
scale, etc. [ . . . ] On the basis of its analysis, the committee is of the view that municipalities
and regions are in the process of realizing these objectives.’’ The main conclusion must be said
to legitimize the reform. In other words, the trend is in the right direction as defined by the
objectives behind the reform. Moreover, the LGR evaluation included many specific assess-
ments of and proposals for each of the four areas, entirely in keeping with the terms of
reference. The committee found problems with the interface between municipalities and regions
in three areas. In the area of specialized social services, the committee proposed the establish-
ment of a national coordination structure, in which the National Board of Social Services plays
a quality assurance role and develops specialist knowledge and services, and that the politicians
should choose between three future models: (1) unchanged responsibilities (which the commit-
tee clearly does not believe will solve the problems), (2) a municipal model, and (3) regional
responsibility for services for specific, limited target groups. When it came to the area of nature
and the environment, the committee also proposed different future models, including a future
state model, an extended municipal solution, or transferring tasks from municipalities to
regions. Concerning rehabilitation (health), the committee suggested a clearer regional compe-
tence, guidelines for visitation, and increased transparency.
The LGR evaluation has first of all been used instrumentally to adjust the reform. Behavioral
influence processes have been important. Hence, shortly after the evaluation was published, the
Danish government presented proposals in June 2013 to adjust the reform according to the
recommendations of the evaluation and later that month, broad political agreement was reached
(Government, 2013a, 2013b). Moreover, the evaluation has been used to legitimize the reform, as
the question of major changes in the reform is no longer on the political agenda. However, in the
longer term, the importance of the evaluation depends in part on the ongoing administrative
follow-up, and on whether the Liberals, after returning to government in 2015 still want to abolish
the regions.
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Theoretical Interpretations of the NAV and LGR Evaluations
On the basis of the analysis it is discussed below how the differences between the two evaluations
can be interpreted according to the four governance perspectives. Table 5 sums up the contribution
of the four positions to the interpretation of the two evaluations.
The rational-instrumental perspective contributes to various extents to understanding the two
evaluations. Whereas it to some extent contributes to understanding the organization as well as the
evaluation process in the Norwegian case, it only in a limited way contributes to understanding
the Danish case. Hence, instrumental rationality characterized part of the evaluation process in the
Norwegian case as the decision to carry through an evaluation was based on an aim to ensure
feedback on reform results and contribute to long-term learning and knowledge creation. According
to this, it was decided to ask the Norwegian Research Council to take responsibility for arranging a
tender in order to be able to select the evaluation project that best suited to fulfill the aims. In 2014,
this decision was followed up by a decision to conduct an evaluation of the evaluation, a so-called
meta-evaluation, to examine how the public sector can best plan, organize, and carry out public-
sector reform evaluations in the future. Contrary to this, neither the process ahead of the decision to
conduct an evaluation nor the evaluation process as such, including the overall evaluation design,
was characterized in the Danish case by instrumental rationality. It is, however, striking how the
opposite pattern is found in relation to how the evaluation results were used in the two countries. In
Norway, the evaluation results were used for enlightenment and to initiate debate but not directly for
Table 5. Comparison of the NAV and LGR Evaluations Based on Four Theoretical Perspectives.
Perspective The NAV Evaluation The LGR Evaluation
Rational-
instrumental
perspective
Contributes to the understanding of the
organization and design of the evaluation.
Limited contribution to the understanding of
the use of the evaluation results, as these
were used for enlightenment rather than in an
instrumental way
Limited contribution to the understanding
of the overall design and the process of
the evaluation. Contribution to the
understanding of the way in which the
secretariat functions of the evaluation
were organized. Considerable
contribution to the understanding of the
political follow-up and use of the
evaluation results
Rational
interest–
based
perspective
Limited contribution to the understanding of the
evaluation. However, some contribution to
the understanding of the negotiation
processes between the research groups about
the division of labor
Considerable contribution to the process
ahead of the decision to conduct an
evaluation, to the overall organization of
the evaluation, and to the process in
which conclusions and proposals were
framed
Institutional-
cultural
perspective
Contribution to the understanding of the fact
that it was natural thing, an SOP, to carry out
an evaluation as well as for the taken-for-
granted organizational model
Contribution to the understanding of
elements in the way in which the
evaluation was organized (the
corporatist culture) as well as to
elements in the design (pragmatism)
Chaos
perspective
Limited contribution to the understanding of the
evaluation. Although some contribution to
the understanding of the process in which the
four performance areas were agreed on
Considerable contribution to the
understanding of the emergent and
unpredictable character of the
evaluation process where the focus of
the evaluation was first narrowed and
later enlarged
Note. NAV ¼ reform of the labor and welfare administration in Norway; LGR ¼ local government reform in Denmark; SOP
¼ standard operating procedure.
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instrumental decision-making, even though one of the central aims was to secure feedback. In
Denmark, by contrast, the evaluation results were used instrumentally in political decision-
making, adjusting the reform in an attempt to solve the problems revealed in the evaluation
process. In addition, in the Danish case, some elements in the organization of the evaluation can
be interpreted as reflecting instrumental rationality. Whereas the organization of the Danish case
mostly reflects the interest-based perspective (a theme we elaborate on below), the way of orga-
nizing the secretariat function can be interpreted as an instrumental action ensuring strong coor-
dination of the work.
Also, the interest-based perspective contributes in varying degrees to understanding the two
evaluations. Whereas the perspective contributes substantially to understanding the Danish case,
it makes a limited contribution to understanding the Norwegian case. Whereas discussions about
whether or not to conduct an evaluation went on in Denmark for years after the political decision on
the reform, there were on the contrary no discussions about this in Norway. In the Norwegian
context, it was taken for granted that the reform should be evaluated. Likewise, whereas the writing
up of reports and conclusions in the Danish case was a negotiation process, it was an analytical
process in the Norwegian case. Only in the phase in which the Norwegian research groups were to
reach agreement on the division of labor did interest-based negotiation processes seem to have
characterized the evaluation process.
The institutional-cultural perspective contributes to the understanding of both cases but in rela-
tion to different aspects. In the Norwegian case, the fact that conducting an evaluation was taken for
granted can be interpreted as a reflection of an institutionalized public-sector evaluation culture
(Dahler-Larsen, Nordkvelle, Fossland, & Netteland, 2013). In the Danish case, the central stake-
holders were invited into the evaluation process in both the committee and the subgroups, which
reflects the Danish tradition for public-sector corporatism (H. F. Hansen & Jørgensen, 2009). Like-
wise, the design of the Danish evaluation can be interpreted as a reflection of the Danish tradition for
pragmatism, defined as focusing on what it is practical to accomplish. The fourth perspective, the
chaos perspective, contributes, as do the first two perspectives to varying extents, to the understand-
ing of the two cases. Whereas it makes a considerable contribution to the understanding of the
emergent and unpredictable evaluation process in the Danish case, its contribution to the under-
standing of the process in the Norwegian case is limited. There is, however, one phase in the
Norwegian case, the process in which the four performance areas are agreed on, where ambiguity
is high, and coincidences are at play. This phase can be interpreted as reflecting the chaos
perspective.
Conclusion
Evaluating large-scale public-sector reforms is a great challenge as different political interests,
stakeholders, and target groups are at stake. The purposes are typically ambiguous from the begin-
ning and they can change over time. In this article, we have demonstrated how to reach an under-
standing of the dynamic and complex nature of the evaluation of such reforms. The analyses of the
comparative case study have shown that despite the similarities of the two reforms, their evaluations
were organized very differently and given varying importance. First, it was only in Norway that
evaluating the reform was taken for granted. In Denmark, there was a political conflict concerning
the evaluation for several years. Second, while the evaluation of the NAV reform in Norway was
organized as a research-based external evaluation in a process that to some degree was characterized
by instrumental rationality, the evaluation of the municipal reform in Denmark was organized as an
internal evaluation, in which key stakeholders were given responsibility for the evaluation and
thereby a platform to safeguard interests. The evaluation process was more a negotiation process
than an analytical process in the Danish context.
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The analysis furthermore illustrates how the chosen way to organize the evaluation provides
structure and direction to the evaluation process and the utilization of its findings. In the Norwegian
case, the external organization produced evaluation findings that were seen by most actors as
generally interesting and useful for long-term knowledge building of relevance to the broader
society. Findings from the evaluation were disseminated widely in the scientific community and
used in the public debate. On the other hand, those responsible for implementing the reform in
Norway did not perceive its findings to be of much use in terms of practical guidance concerning
how to adjust and improve the ongoing implementation of the reform. In the Danish case, on the
contrary, the evaluation did not have much impact on the scientific discourse or the public debate,
but the internal organization seems to have been effective in producing proposals for the adjustment
of the reform process that were both politically acceptable, possible to implement, and had the
support of the actors responsible for implementing them. The political and emerging dimensions of
the organization of the Danish evaluation thus provide an important basis for the succeeding
instrumental utilization of its proposals.
The two evaluations also differed greatly on the time dimension. While the Norwegian evaluation
went on for 7 years, the Danish evaluation was delimited to 1 year. When the decision to evaluate
large-scale reforms is taken consensually in the early stage, it is possible to evaluate the entire
implementation process with all the challenges of such an undertaking. This happened in the
Norwegian case and underlines the interpretational power of the rational-instrumental perspective.
However, it also seems to hamper instrumental utilization because large-scale complex reforms
often undergo changes as they are implemented over a long time period. On the other hand, when
the decision whether or not to conduct the evaluation is a matter of political controversy, as in the
Danish case, the rational-instrumental perspective loses some of its interpretational power, due to
the unitary features of this perspective. The decision to evaluate is postponed and when it is made
several years into the implementation stages of the reform, the patience to wait for evaluation
findings may be limited. There is pressure to reach fast conclusions. This happened in the Danish
case and stresses the interpretational power of the rational interest–based perspective. But at the
same time, it leaves an open playground for negotiations.
The comparative analyses indicate important differences in the roles of the evaluators in the
two types of evaluations. The externally organized research-based evaluation tends to enhance a
distance between the evaluator and the evaluand; the autonomy of the evaluator and valid knowl-
edge based on scientific standards are the dominant values. The internally organized research-
based evaluation with a rather tight time schedule tends to enhance close relations between
evaluator and evaluand; the rallying of consensus concerning politically and administratively
feasible practical proposals tends to be the dominant value. We do not imply that useful advice
was neglected in the Norwegian case or that valid knowledge generation was neglected in the
Danish case, but the priorities in the case of trade-offs seem to us to have been pretty clear. We will
return to the question about internal or external evaluation and the roles of the evaluators below in
the paragraph about implications.
Our analysis has also shown how the institutional-cultural perspective enhances our understand-
ing of the differences between the two countries. In Norway, it was considered obvious and beyond
dispute to evaluate the NAV reform. The task was given to the Norwegian Research Council, an
organization with a mature evaluation culture. Alternative ways of organizing the evaluation were
not considered. In Denmark, on the other hand, it was a matter of political dispute for several years
whether or not to evaluate the municipal reform. When the decision to evaluate was finally made,
practical considerations of feasibility based on the political agenda and the short time horizon led to
an internally organized evaluation. Finally, the chaos perspective contributes to understanding
evaluation processes as emergent, rather than linear and predictable. Overall, this perspective is
first and foremost relevant to the Danish case.
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Applying a theoretical framework including four perspectives has enabled us to better grasp the
complexity of evaluating large-scale public-sector reforms, which are always in flux, and character-
ized by ambitious and ambiguous aims. This was not only illustrated by the fact that the four
perspectives to various extents contribute to understanding the different phases of the two evalua-
tions. It is also interesting to observe how instrumental rationality in the planning phase and
organization of an evaluation does not necessarily result in instrumental utilization, which was
clearly illustrated in the Norwegian case.
Implications for How to Handle Evaluation Challenges
It was also an ambition of ours to answer the difficult question of how to approach evaluations of
large-scale public-sector reforms. In that respect, the different perspectives can also be used to
illustrate how challenges in evaluations organized as external research or as internal evaluations
could be handled. External research-based evaluations, such as the Norwegian NAV evaluation,
typically have ambitions about generating generalizable knowledge and spreading this to the aca-
demic community (as well as the evaluation sponsor), as such evaluations develop in an academic
culture that poses basic questions and critically assesses methodological issues (Halvorsen, 2013, p.
244). In this context, it is a challenge to obtain evaluation results that can be considered usable in the
praxis of implementing and further developing the reform in focus. However, the interest-based
perspective, the institutional-cultural perspective, and the chaos perspective hopefully can give some
ideas about how to handle these challenges. According to the interest-based perspective, external
evaluators, in addition to considering themselves academics, could play the role of leaders of
negotiations, inviting stakeholders into a dialogue, and listening to stakeholders’ demands for
knowledge. According to the institutional-cultural perspective, actors responsible for reform imple-
mentation and development must be expected to have limited confidence in the ability of academic
evaluators to deliver usable results. Thus, academic evaluators have to work consciously with
building trust. Finally, according to the chaos perspective, academic evaluators could try to create
platforms to facilitate processes and to discuss and handle reform ambiguity.
In contrast, internal evaluations can be expected to be at risk of producing results that are not
considered trustworthy and independent, but rather to be contributions supporting powerful stake-
holders. In this context, internal evaluators could use the rational-instrumental perspective as a
model for putting methodological issues on the agenda for critical discussion in a strategy to enhance
the credibility of results. Moreover, the interest-based perspective can generate reflections on how to
reach a compromise that can be expected to be lasting, and according to the institutional-cultural
perspective, reflections can be made on how to create a trustworthy evaluation, also for others than
the involved stakeholders. Finally, according to the chaos perspective, internal evaluators could also
try to create platforms to facilitate processes and to discuss and handle reform ambiguity.
Questions for Further Research
Our comparative analysis above has uncovered important characteristics related to the evaluation of
large-scale public-sector reforms and indicated how evaluators may cope with the challenges posed
by such evaluations. Like most research projects, the analysis also raises a number of questions
which we can only scratch the surface of and which we must leave as open questions for future
research.
One question posed by our analysis is why large-scale public-sector reforms are a rare evaluand
and why they, despite that, were evaluated in our two cases? In the introduction and the literature
review, we established that such reforms are rarely evaluated, especially in terms of external
evaluations, and used it as rationale for the importance of our study. It is however a puzzle, akin
to a ‘‘paradox of public management reform’’ (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011b, p. 158), that large-scale
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public-sector reforms often emphasizing performance management and evaluation as essential
governance instruments are rarely evaluated themselves. A recent study, finding negative or very
little impact of the New Public Management reforms in the United Kingdom in recent decades
(Hood & Dixon, 2015), may indicate a partial answer. In order to mobilize support, such reforms are
often ‘‘oversold’’ and their results are thus likely to be disappointing by reformers own self-imposed
standards. Since such reforms are irreversible, their evaluation is hardly appealing to responsible
reformers. Nevertheless, in our cases, the two reforms were evaluated and in the Norwegian case this
evaluation was considered self-evident. This poses questions concerning which contingencies may
enhance or inhibit the evaluation of large-scale public-sector reforms, which is however beyond the
scope of the present analysis.
A second question, by and large excluded from our analysis, is related to the technical quality of
the evaluations. An obvious (probably too obvious) thesis might be that external research-based
evaluations are more likely to enhance a high level of technical quality in the evaluation than internal
evaluations. Technical quality is a tricky issue though and depends on purpose and as well as a
number of other contingencies.
Space only allows us to raise these final intriguing questions, while possible answers are left to
future research projects.
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